Introduction
Although the first hypermarket dates back to 1963 (Cliquet, 2000 , large format retailers (also referred to as the "big boxes") did not become a familiar sight to shoppers until the 1990s. They can be spotted as a tall, singlestoried, free-stnnding, metallic-like superstructure situated on a spacious asphalt parking lor. ·n,ey are twice as likely to be located in a suburban area as opposed to the central, metro area and are found at a major thoroughfare or alongside a highway with easy access Qones and Doucet, 2000) . The stores are relatively large and typically exceed I 00,000 sq.ft or I 0,000 sq.m, although ones over 200,000 sq.ft or 20,000 sq.m are not uncommon.
Size is relative, however, and varies across markets and retail categories. In France, a large format retailer is a store of least 5,000 sq.m, although "big hypermarkets" average about fl,OOO sq.m per store (Ciiquet, 2000) .
In a small UK city, a food superstore with an area of 40,000 to 60,000 sq.ft or about 5,000 sq.m would be regarded as a large format retailer. According to Portuguese Jaw, a large fonn.at store is one over 2,000 sq .m in counties with 30,000 or more inhabitants and over 1,000 sq.m otherwise (Farhangrnehr et a/., 2000) .
"I11e large format retailer is usually one of five types: (I) discount department store carrying nonfood merchandise, e.g. Wal-Mart discussion of numerous effects, including benefits to the department store; consumer, differences in the demographics of large (2) super food warehouse carrying food only, format store shoppers, rapid growth in the sales and e.g. Cub warehouse; market share of the new entrant, growth in the community economy, growth and decline in various commercial sectors, decline in the economy of nearby markets, creation and losses of jobs, and increases and decreases in market efficiency. Given these effects, suggests implications for each community stakeholder.
listed are a large number of questions for future research.
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These five types of large format retailers represent a spectrum of retail operations and differ from one another on several dimensions including breadth and deptl1 of product assortment, level of service, pricing policy and customer demographic profile. Nonetheless, tl1ere is a commonality among these new retailers in terms of their sheer physical size, their emphasis on low price or value, their low gross margin/high volume business, and, most importantly, the effects they engender on market entry. The economic, structural and communal repercussions of the market entry of these new fonnat retailers are several and it is useful to attempt to catalogue them and explore their various implications. Furthermore, the magnitude and direction of ilie many potential effecrs of iliese giant retailers are not self-evident, leaving open the question as to how these new members of a community should be regarded. For instance, cloes tl1e entry of a new retailer enhance or hinder ilic health of a competitive market struCTUre? If oilier retailers offering similar products arc driven out of business on entry of ilie large format retailer, are the benefits of competition lost in the long run? Does a large format retailer increase primary demand or is ir a zero sum game? As ilie e!Iccts associated with entry of the large fom1~H retailer tend to be simultaneously positive and neg,.tivc, what is the ncr result?
As a resull of ilicse questions, tl1c entry of large format retailers. into a community is often met with ambivalence. The reactions range from enthusiastic support, involving developer subsidisation, to bitter opposition, involving zoning and growth restrictions. However, ambivalence about ilie many potcmial etlects of a retail institution is not a new phenomenon and is imimately associated with growrh and evolution in ilie retail sector. For example, the emergence of department stores was not uniformly welcomed in t11e previous century. Similar sentiments were expressed in ilie 1920s and the 1 930s about rerail chains. In tl1e 1950s and 1960s, ilie shopping centers appeared and competed customt,rs. Now, at ilie end of this century, attention has come to f(Jcus on ilie widespread emergence of the large format retailers.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse, document and discuss the effects associated with tl1e entry of a large format retailer, especially as it affects a small city or town. A small town or city means a market of 100,000 or fewer people. Certain patterns of effects have been observed when a large format retailer enters imo this kind of community. While the effects instilled by the big boxes may not be so different: in the context of the larger or the smaller communities, it is believed iliat iliese effects are likely to be felt wiili much greater intensity in ilie smaller communities. The sm,lller communities tend to be more economically fragile and thus more vulnerable to ilie effects associated wiili the entry of a large format retailer.
'The paper is based on a review of several published and unpublished studies where iliese effects could be identified. The analysis of secondary infomwtion sources was supplemented by ilie views of knowledgeable individuals. Fift<'en interviews were conducted among developers, economic development offtcials, municipal government officials, urban planners and professionals. The opinions of the executives and ilie store managers at ilic incumbent and ilie incoming retail establishments were also considered.
'I11e paper anempts to inform the various stakeholders, such as existing businesses, the community and its citizens, ilie municipal government, the near-by communities and ilic new large format retailer itself, about ilie various costs and benefits associated with its arrival into a community. It indicates to retail incumbents, for example, how ilieir business might be affected and how they might best maintain shopper loyalty. It suggests to ilie new market entrant what may be ilie responsible ways for introducing ilieir new store into ilie community. It informs the local govemments and urban officials as to what is likely to be tl1e long-term impact of iliis irreversible ch•mge. Finally, it also identifies areas where information about market entry effects is scarce and where future research can be directed.
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Ma<ket entry effect> of la<ge format reta~ro: a stakeholder analysis
Stephen J. Arnold and Moni~> Narilllg luthra Arnold et al. (1997) , across four studies of low price department stores, found chat 29 to 37 percent of the respondents ranked location as the most important attribute in choosing the store at which they shopped most often. Further, 15 to 21 percent of the respondents ranked assortment as the most important attribute determining their store choice. Also, 19 to 25 percent of the respondents rankl~d low price to be the most important reason when choosing a store. In the case of the six retail food store studies conducted by the same researchers, 12 to 22 percent of the respondents regarded price as the most important attribute. In the case of the seven home improvement studies, this percentage ranged between 9 and 21 percent and, in the case of the nine warehouse club studies, 65 to 82 percent of the respondents identified low prices as the most important reason.
Stakeholder. consumers

Inherent consurner benefits
In the context of the above attributes identified by the c()nsumen as determinant in store choice, i.e. location, assortment and low price, it is evident that a well-located, large forr:.1at retailer in a small community has an inherent advantage when compared to other retailers. Huff's (1964) gravity model of retail attraction provides support for the above argument by suggesting that shoppers choose stores primarily on the basis of distance (minimal for the large format retailer in a small community) and area (relatively large for the new entrant and res11lting i11 a desirabl<; wide a"ortmem).
To explain further, a contemporary \Val-Mart discount store occupies up to 120,000 square feet, while Costco and Home Depot occupy about 130,000 square feet. Along with the wide assortment afforded by their large size, the stores of new format retailers in smaller communities are not more than 15 minutes ~way by automobile. Further, stores such as the Wai-Man discount store, WalMarr supercentcr, Costco and Home Depot offer an everyday low price, supported by their large volume buying power and a low cost strategy. Thus, the large format retailers are able to offer a price advantage when compared to the other retailers.
These expectations are mirrored in recent European and North American studies. For instance, Aalto-Setalii (2000) found that large Firmish stores h~ve on averuge 10 pen:ent 141 rnternatiooal Journal of R•tail & Distribution Management Volume 28 · Nllrlber 1115 · 2000 lower costs and 10 pero;:ent lower prkes than small stores. Farhangmehr et al. (2000) found one-stop shopping convenience and price to be the reasons why Bmga, Portugal consumers prefer to shop at hypermarkets rather than traditional stores. Seiders and Tigert (2000) showed that a Wal-Mart Supercenter scon" highest on lowest prices, best value, best assortment of non-foods, cleanest stores and fastest checkout among US consumers. Brennan and Lundsten (2000) found tl1at, in five small Minnesota towns, low prices and large variety account for almost 80 percent of the primary reasons why consumers shop discounters.
"The large format retailer may not be adept in evt.."l'Y producr line. For example, Stone's (199 '5, p. 7 6) study revealed that warehouse club members rated their store a bener value for dry goods, health and beauty aids and general merchandise. However, the supermarket was rated higher for produce, meat, deli and bakery goods. Further, even though a warehouse may carry a large product line, it: may not off€r ~€Vcral diff<rr~nt brands or sizes in each product category. In one interview with n Costco real estate broker, it was brought up that, although Costco may sell several different products, it does not offer much variety in each product category. Thus, certain trade-offs may exist in case of the warehouse clubs, in that they may b€ abk to offer goods at low prices but not a \1tide assortment in each product category. Thus, in this sense, opportunities may exist for smaller format retailers, such as t.lJ.e supermarkets.
Besides location, assortment and price, the other inherent consumer benefits include an efficient, climatically-controlled, one-stop shopping experience with extended shopping hours. 'The large formnt retailers todny include in their stores travel agencies, wine stores, film processing, shoe repairs, dry cleaners, pharmacies and banking services. These additional services make these stores destinations for consumers.
Another advantage of a large format retailer is the consistency in its service offering. A large format store, which is generally a part of a multinational chain, tends to have the same layout, design, product assortment and level of service. In other words, the services provided at a large format store are based on a formula. Consumers often prefer to know that in any Wal-Mart, for example, the food items would be close to the cash checkouts or that the employee would be friendly and helpful. TI1is helps to build consumer loyalty.
1\ltbougb the above mentioned attributes constitute the preference structure of an av.:rage conwmcr, rltcsc attributes may not be s~licnt for llll shoppers. Some focm group p~n:icipam,; said rhey wou!d never hec<Jme loyal to this type of store because the stores were just too big and lacking in personal interactions (Morganosky and Cude, 2000) . They were also dissatisfied over pricing mistakes, changing layouts, unused checkout llmes nnd local business impa<;;t. This critkal vjew on the parr of some c<Jnsumers leaqs to a discussion of the specific demographic profiles of the consumers who shop at these large format retailers.
Differences in the demographics of large fonnat store !!happen>
The large format retailer may not be an attractive option for all consumer segments. For example, smaller and more serviceoriented stores may enjoy increased patronage from seniors and/or wealthier households. However, certain demographic trends over the years have made shopping at large format retailers appea\i!tg to cen:ai11 consumer segments. For instance, with both the spouses working and an increasing number of single parent families, the longer hours of the large format retailer prove to be very convenient. Furrl1er, the ease associated with one-smp shopping has also contribmed to the suc<;elis of large f<mnat retai\!!1&-The movement of the large baby-boom age cohort through family-rearing years has also favoured the large format retailers. With food and mass merchandise being sold at everyday low prices, the discount stores and supercenters have appealed to the large-family, value·· comci_olls comumers. H<.1wever, the appeal of the large format retailer may not remain as great as the baby-boomers rum 50 and their children leave the family nest.
Several studies have been conducted that aim at evolving a profile of the consumers who shop at the large format stores. Arnold (1997) rnndomly sRmpkd female heads of households ip Kingston on three occasiom over a period of three years and compared the shoppers and rl1e non-shoppers of large discount stores. The profile of these rwo segments revealed that, while the shoppers tend to be in the middle age and middle in.;;ome categories, the non-shoppers tend to
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In an 11-city study by Tigert eta/. (1992) Alterations to the relative importance of store choice attributes The study by Arnold et a/. (1998) found that the market entry of a large format retailer modified the importance or salience of the an;ibme~ u,;ed 1;<) c;ompru-e a.!!d choOSe S~o!"l;S, Their research found that, on the entry of Wal-Mart into a market, consumers began to place more importance on the attributes emphasised by Wal-Mart such as "low or best prices" and "helpful and friendly service." For example, before Wal-Mart entered the Kingston 1muket, only one in every three shoppers c;laimed that !ow Price wa~ t..he most important reason for choosing the store at which they shopped most often. Three years later, one out of every rwo shoppers stated low price to be the most important reason for choosing a store. TI1ese results were interpreted as supporting the claim that the Market entry ~Hoos of large tonn.-1t retni~s: a ~takeholder ~~is
shift in the attribute saliences was consistent with the attributes that defined Wal-Man. This "ntnrkct spoiler" impact can be detrimental for other retailers in the trading area who do nor. cotliirm to "everyday low prices" and thus can lower the store's attractiveness for the consumer. The study also found that less importance was placed on features emphasised by other stores, such as the various sales promotion advcrr.iscments, quality and credit card acceptability.
Stakeholder: existing retailers and other businesses
The three important effects engendered by the large fom1at retailer on the existing retailers and other businesses are: rapid market penetration in the grov.'th stage of the life cycle, decline in the sales of the local retail stores, and growth and decline in various commercial sectors. A discussion of each of these effects follows.
Rapid nmrket penetration in the growth ~tage of the retail life cycle Several studies show tltat an important pattern associated with the entry of a large format retailer is an accelerated rate of market penetration. To begin, Arnold's (1997) Kingston, Canada tracking surveys recorded Wal-Mart's shar~ of female heads of households as increasing from 7 percent at market entry in 1991 to 23 percent after 18 months and to 30 percent after three years. In another study by Seiders and Tigert (2000) and pertaining to the two small towns of Gainesville, Georgia and Victoria, Texas, the same pattern was observed. A year after the opening of tlte \XTaHviart and K.mart supercenters in Gainesville, Wal-Mart had captured l 0 percent of the primary shoppers, while Kmart had captured 6 percent. Similarly, in Victoria, it was observed that after a year Wal-Mart supercenter had acquired 13 percent of the shoppers, while Kmarr supcrcenter had acquired a 7 percent share. Jones and Doucet (2000) estimated Wai-Marr had 25 percent of rhc department store sector in the Greater Toronto area in 1997 only three years after market entry. Toys 'R' Us had a similar share in the toys and hobbies while IKEA had 19 percent of furniture/household furrtishings and Home
Depot 33 percent of the retail hardware! lumber/home repair business. Tigert ( 1984) ) reponed that hypermarkets entered Portugal in the late 1980s, and by I 996 72 percent of Braga respondents used it as a major shopping outlet. However, patronage depended on the type of good and the hypermarket w;1s the preferred type of retail store f()r [reguem!y p1,1rch::~~ecl pac\qlged goods, e.g. detergents and household cleaning, personal cleaning, beverages, dairy products, groceries, toys, frozen foods and beauty care/perfumes. In contrast, the majority of respondents reported buying goldsmith/jewellery, furniture/decorations, footwear, clothing, bread, stationery goods, meat and fish at traditional specialised, grocery and minimarket stores.
Some studies suggest tl1at large format retailers are likely to experience a life cycle of growth, maturity and decline, similar to department stores :111d variety stores. For instance, Farhangrnchr et al. (2000) reported that hypermarket growth in Portugal peaked in 199 5. 1lus maturing of the hypermarket format was due not only to the emergence of small shopkeeper protectionist, political and legal forces, but also to increased competition from supermarkets and limited assortment discount stores, e.g. Lidl. Similarly, Cliquet (2000) observed that hypermarket growth in France had kvelled off and, after estimating a life cycle curve, predicted this format could disappear by around 2015. Hahn (2000) suggested that it took only ten years for US power centers comprising big box retailers to rnmure, and by the mid-I 990s many big boxes were deserted due to consolidation and bankruptcies. She also identified Home Depot, Wal-Mart and Office Max testing much smaller store sizes. Finally, California, Arizona and Maryland have either proposed or made zoning changes that apply size con,trnints to the large format retailer.
Decline in the sales of the local retail stores While the large format retailers gain rapid rn~rkct p<:nctr~tion, it is at the expense of existing retailers who are confronted with declining market share, sales and profits. For instance, Vance and Scott (1994) examined the impact of a Wal-Mart superccnter on the sales of seven grocery stores. The study observed that at the end of a three-month period, local grocery sales declined by an average of 11 percent per store. Subram~nian and Marquardt (1995) looked into the impact of large fonnat retailers on local stores and noted that the arrival of Wal-Mart in small towns precipimted a decline in the number of local stores. Jn Arnold's (1997) Kingston, Canada tracking studies, Wal-Mart's gain was ~t the expense of all other department stores. Home Depot's gain in the same market (Arnold et al., 2000) came from Ca,;hwar and Beaver Lu!nber \Vhose rnarket shares were halved. Four nut of every five traditional Braga, Portugal retailers reported that the newly artivcd hypcm1arkets resulted in a lower number of 'ustom~rs, sales volume, profit margin and profit (Farhangmehr eta!., 2000) . Of 222 small retailers in five Nebraska communities in which a \Val-Mart store recently opened, 53 percent reported suffering negative consequences (McGee, 1996) . Jn eight retail categories in direct competition with big_ boxes in the Greater Toronto area (Jones and Doucet, 2000) , there was an overall decline of 7 percent in share of total stores. Declines were greatest in office products (·-23 percent) and hardware (-·17 percent). Seiders and Tigert (2000) concluded that a supercenter is likely to achieve a "20 percent market share in the retail food m~rket" ~nd th~t "m~ny of the weakest traditional supennarket chains in each market will even rually disappear."
In au interview witl1 the manager of one of the Loeh chain's supermarkets, the manager revealed that the warehouse club Costco was expected to lead to a 5 percent decline in Loeb sales. H<: not,,d thm other competitors
Volume 28 · Number 4/S · 2000 · 139-154 could expect a "larger shrink" if they were located closer to the new Costco or if they sold in bulk. He observed, for instance, that a "no frills", discount bulk grocery store, could face a 15 percent to 20 percent decline in sales.
Growth and decline in various comn1ercial sectors Anotl1er phenomenon associated with the growth of large format retailers is the extent to which their growth spills over to other commercial sectors. Stone's (1995) sntdy of 34 Iowa towns with new \Val-l\1.art stores found sales increases in certain specific commercial sectors. The sales increase was reported in general merchandise ( +44 P<'rcem), home furnishings ( +9 percent) and eating and drinking (+3 percent). Based on c..-rtain observational and llnecdOtlll ~vid~nce, the study also suggested that additio[laJ traffic generated by rhe entry of a Wal-Mart store boosted the sales in stores carrying upscale clothing, upscale shoes, upscale gifts and upscale jewellery. Further, an increase in sales was also reported for gas stations, personal and b1.1~iness service facilities. TI1us, in essence, the study suggested that the st9res with ~;pecialised offerings tended to gain on the entry of a \"i;'al-Mart. Davidson and Rummel (2000) showed this result, with Wal-Mart host towns experiencing greater increases in food sales, restaurants and building supply stores.
An important way in which !he 11ew fofi1lat retailer creates economic spin-off's is by serving as a guaranteed generator of traffic. A city of Toronro informant cited a study that showed that a new supermarket would "redirect" $3-$4.5 million in sales to the nearby downtown stores. 'TI1e study also indicated that the supermarket might also lead to other brand name-store openings and strcn!~hen other businesses such as restaurants, personal services, etc. A manager in one interview likewise noted that ~\Vhen [Costco] has opened you11 see other businesses spring around it, you'll see more food industry ... yo\1 ' 11 see other companies c0me in ... ''
Economic spin-ofu may also be generated by way of additional services required by the new format retailers. Often these services include distribution services, advertising servi<:es, truck rentals, food acquisitions, maintenance, architectural, elecrrical and Markf'l entry e-ffe-cts of large format r~t.:1Uer!.: a stakehol~r anatysic;
Stephen J. Arnold and Monika Narang W!hra mechanical engineering services. ·Ozment and Jones (1990a Jones ( , 1990b found an increase in the sale of services such as automobile repair und eating and drinking subsequent to the entry of a large format n~tailer. Contrary viewpoints were found in regard to the creation of economic spin-offs by way of services required by the new format retailer. The generation of these economic spin-offs has been contested on the ground that since the new entrant retailer,; tend to have established ways of doing business, opportunities for local business are not generated. For instance, Weinstein (1994) and Lang (1981) observed that organisations new To t11e market, and chain stores in particular, rely on their previous distributor,;. Further, other professional services, such as legal, accounting, marketing, and in.o;urance, are obtained through the head office rather than through local branches. Lang ( 19 81) cited a downtown manager who observed that "they [the Lc~rge format retailers] buy nothing from our local wholesaier,;. Even their stationery and supplies are purchased outside the city. Other than a few cierks, their employees are brought in."
Not surprisingly, a counter-opinion was found in an interview with the public relations manager of Home Depot. The manager specificaliy noted that " ... we ar" Home Depot Canada. We don't bring Americans to work in our stores; all the employees arc Cunadian. As far as the merchandise and the vendors, we buy Canadian. Absolutely. If there is u Canadian window company and an American window company, t11ere is no doubt we buy Canadian."
Just as the entry of the large format retail<!r results in the growth of certain retail categories, research Indicates that it also leads to a decline in other categories. For instance, Stone (1995) observed in some retail sectors declines in the sr;mdardised per capita sales ratios. "Ibese sectors included apparel (--18 percem), specialty (-H percent), building supply (-13 percent) and grocery (-5 percent). In the same study, a comparison of the market share of Iowa stores between 1983 and 1993 showed decreases ranged from 3 percent for women's apparel stores to 44 percent for men's/boy's appareL In between were autoparts (--9 percent), drug (-11 percent), grocery (-14 percent), jewellery (-19 percent), shoe (-20 percent), variety ( -26 percent), lawn and 145
Implications for incumbent retailers
Given these effects, it is relevant to consider hoth what the incumbent retailers have done and what they should do to counter the problem. l'arhangmehr et al. (2000) found significant differences between the various store formats in their responses to the new hypcrmarket competition in Braga, Portugal. For example, traditional grocery stores were less inclined, compared to specialist retailer,;, to invest in training, to search for new suppliers or to enter into partnerships with other retaile~ for the purchase of goods or the development of promotional campaigns. Aliliough there were some differences between those who were negatively affected by Wal-Mart's arrival and those who were not, McGee ( 1996) found that neither group made dramatic adjustments to their competitive strategy. McGee (1996) cited other studies where the small retailer,; appear eimer unwilling or unable to enact a competitive response.
The prescrip1ions for doing business in a Wal-Mart town arc not to compete on price nor to offer rhe same products. Stone (1995) suggested complementary merchandise, e.g. upscale products, greater variety in a specific category, extended hour,; of operation, improved customer service skills and refined rernrn policies. Davidson said she took exactly ilies'' steps with her Maine retail furniture store and experienced increased sales levels annually (Davidson and Rummel, 2000) . Brennan and Lundsten (2000) suggested specialty stores differentiate themselves from discounters by increasing prod ucr assortments in the key categories carried, upgrading quality with branded merchandise not available to discounters, and maintaining good in-srock positions.
Existing retailers must recognise that the appeal of the new retailer is limited to a specific demographic and socio-economic segment, albeit a large portion of the population. The dissatisfaction with large form at retailers expressed by some of Morganosky and Cude's (200o) focus group participants reinforces this notion of market segmentation. This in1plies that the existing retailer can focus on the shopper segments that are nor: drawn towards the new retailer. For instance, they could focus on the fewer Mar\.~t Pfltry eflli!cts. ol large lonnat retailers.: a s.t.ak.ehokkH anatysis.
Slephen J. Arnold and Monib IINang Lllthra customers who value the specialty goods and more satisfying service mix possible in a small store. The one dissension from this prescription comes from Peterson and McGee (2000) , who conclnded after analysing their retailer data that a ~ustained marketing emphasis on quality is not a clear prescription for removing The impact of \Val-Man's presence.
Stakeholders: citizens, communities and governments
Economic growth
If d1e large format retailers were to 'imply take the market share from weaker competitors, there would not be any change in the overall economic activity. However, an implication of the Huff's gravity model as applied to the large format retailers is the notion of a greater trading circle. 'D1e larger store area of the new retailer will increase its attractiveness to more distant shopp<~rs, some of whom will trade off The more disTanT location for a lower price, greater a"ortment and one->top shopping convenience. As a result, t.!-Je economic healTh of the enrry market is likely to improve, when measured in term~; of retail sales, per capita sa1es; sales taxes, reel estate/property taxes, household incomes, per capita i..tl.come, employment levels, retail prices and available goods assortment.
Several studies consistently reflect a ner po>itive boost to the economic health associated wid1 the entry of a new retailer. For instance, the Stone (1995) study conducted in 1993 of 34 Iowa towns with populations of 30,000 compared changes in standardised per capita sales ratios over a five-year period subsequent to a \Val-l'Ybrt opepjng in the town. The results revealed that the total per capita sales increased by 5.6 per(:cnt. Davidson and Rummel (2000) compared rhe sales tax records of 11 \'V'"I-1\\arT hn'<t towns in Maine with those in ten nearby towns and 18 other towns more !han 15 miles away, one through four years after \V al-Mun's entry. Results reflected in the ta.x records showed significant sales increases in the \Val-Mart towns, esp<~cially for general merchandise, while retail sales in neighbouring towns declined or increased at relatively low rates. Other towns in Maine did not show the same rates of growth as the host towns.
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A study was made by researchers at the College of Business and Public Administration, University of Mi%ouri, Columbia, of 14 rural Missouri countil-s in which \Val-Mart opened stores between 1983 and 1988. Not only did the re1;earchers find a "significant positive effect on salC~<-Tax revenue" but They also revealed that the salariC~<, retail employment, personal and per capita income increased in "almost" every county (dted by Vance and Scott 1994, p. 141 ).
In a similar study, Jones (1990a, 1990b) examined counties with populations herween B,OOO and 50,000 in the three US states of Arkansas, !vtissouri and Oklahoma. The researchers compared 104 counties with a discount retail chain, to 78 e<mr1ties without one, and found that counties with a discount re1ail chain fared bener than 1:1'lose without, in terms of per capita income, level of employment, local tax revenues, bank deposits, and number and value of new houses.
Cliquct (2000) identified economic benefits of large format retailers at the national level. He observed t.,.>-,:n hypermarkets widened access to consumer goods and permitted many suppliers, especially the smallest, to export to any place in the world where their hypcrmarket customers were located. He also thought that because hypermarkcts helped to reduce: int1ation, government action against the hypermarkets has always been designed more to please small shopkeepers than to limit hypennarket growth. \XThile the gruvity model provides a theoretical rationale for the economic growth accompanying the entry of large fom1at retailer, an altc:n1ativc: explanation also exists. Considerable investment in the construction of large format stores would be made only in those local or national markets where there are positive economic indicators. Thus, much can be ntrributed to the soundness of the entrant retailer's location analysis. In sum, a more general question, warranting furTher research, would be whether retail developments precede or follow economic gro'Nth"? Some reservations about the long-term positive economic cffe<:ts were expressed dmmg the interviews with some of the informants. A city planner observed that many times the big boxes "pack up and leave" certain locations. Such an event would normally follow the opening of a centrally Market •~try effects of large locrn.at retailers: a ~taleholder analysis.
------St'f'hen J. Arnold and Monih Ni>rang IJJthra locat<:d Wul-Mart supercentcr, which would render the local Wal-Mart store in a nearby town super!1uouR. Some of the small businesses in the nearby town would havt• closed long ~go bee~ use of the tough competition from the big box retailer. The city planner noted that as a consequence " ... now there's nobody left in the town to sell you anything, so you now [have to] drive 30 miles to get anything." A similar incident was described by Vance and Scott (1994, p, 152) , where the closing of~ Wal-Mart ~tore in Heame, Texas, led a minister and a former resident to accuse "the discount chain of killing his home town twice -once when it entered the town and damaged its local businesses and the second time when it left."
Another important reservation associated with economic growth revolves around tbe fact th:;~t the new, large fonnat retailer may not generate new business for itself, i.e. create primacy demand, but inst1:ad take marker share from existing businrsses. When the latter effect occurs, tl1c economic growth in the market of entry of the large format retailer is at thi: expense of the downtown business con~ or else the s11rrn1mding towns ;md vil1:1gcs. A Horne Depot rcpresem;nive defended her company on this point by noting that Home Depot, by organising do-ityourself clinics, makes the market larger. It creates a demand for something that did not exist before. As an examplL'' she explained that the store may hold dinics for peopk who want to remodel their hathroom hut do nor know how to do it. In such cases, usuddenly people who weren't do-it-you!'$elf in the past suddenly {become] do-it-yourselfe!'$.~ Reservations pertaining to the long--term economic growth of the community also concern the fact that, ,;ince the large fomnt retailers are often a part of large, multinational, publicly traded companies, their profits and dividends are sent to the corporate headquarters ~nd then to the shareholder<;. Vance and Scott (1994) cir.ed a local clothing store owner who observed that, ~They do such a tremendous sales volume and their money leave> the town immediately. TI1at money may have circulated among several businesses in r.own, but now, once it's gone, it's gone." A downtown business association economic development officer also noted that a crucial difference between the new fom1~t retailer and a local independent was thai the local independent spent titeir profits in the towns where they lived. Thus, the essence of the argument is tl1at, since profits and dividends are siphoned out of the community, th~ opportunity for a multiplier effect, that would otherwise have created several economic spin-offs in the community, is forfeited. For instance, in a study by Irchu (1982) , it was found that most of the malls in Atlantic Canada were owned and managed by hom<: offices in central Canada, The result of rhis ownership was that a substantial portion of the profits left the province from where i r was gener~ted.
Decline in the downtown business district TI1e core issue underlying this crucial impact is whether the downtown core or the central business distrkt suffers and loses business as a consequence of the entry of a large format retailer. An inability of the new retailer to create primary demand and the convenience assochtted witlt one-stop shopping destination may also be two important reasons for me loss of business experienced by downtown stores.
While in rhe ~;ase of category specialists such as Home Depot or Toys 'R' Us, the problem of uonc-stop" shopping destination is mitigated, in the sense that these stores do not offer products apnrt from hardware and toys respectively, and the supercenters, the discount stor<'s and tbe warehouse clubs often become the end destinations. The v~rious warehouse cluhs and supercenters carry a wide assorrmen t t)f goods oilier than mass merchandise, including fresh produce, meat, dairy and bakery products. Further, many services such as u wine shop, travel services, photo furnishing, shoe repair, prescription lens etc. arc also offered. In such cases, the new fom1at rct~iler may have the same detrimental effect on the central business district (CBD) as did the construction of shopping malls.
'Tbe studies pertaining to the impact of new shopping malls on the CBD show consistently a negative impact. For example, Muller ( 1978) studied six cities in which a regional mull had been built and found that sales were reduced by an average of 3 7 percent in me ftve downtown areas. Dent's (1985) study of Atlanta's puhli<: policy showed that, once interstate highways were built, the nearby CBD lost 25 percent of their sales while the shopping malls experienced a high growth.
Ghosh and McLafferty (1991) pointed out
M.uk(lt entry {>jfects, ol Llcgc tcxmat ~taiJt'fs.: a s.takehokle-r ilnatys.is. 5!'flhon J. Amok! and Monib NaJang lut!Jfa that the retail sales were cut by half in the period from 1964-1977 as the popularity of the ~uburbtm mall~ incrct~scd. lrcha (1982) found that tl1e level of sales in the existinn retail outlets showed a decrease relative to the sales gained hy the new shopping center. Goss (1993) reported that the west Getman enclosed pedcs1.rian malls stole retail sales from the outer streets.
From these studies, it can be inferred that the establishment of a new, large format retailer might have an adven;e effect on the downtown business units. Peterson and McGee's (2000) mail survey of 428 Ncbmska and Kansas businesses from five towns in which Wal-Mart opened during 1989-1994 supports tl1is logic. Of the businesses with less than $1 million in sales and which were located in tht~ central business district, 64 percent reponed a negative impact. Hallsworth and Worthington (2000) reported that, although a new Safeway store widened the catchment area of the town as a whole, it was estimated that the town center market share had fallen by I 0 percentage points and that there had been heavy uade diversion.
Another interesring effect related to any potential decline in downtown bus.iness. was.
brought up during the cnursc of an interview with an urban and regional planning professor. He pointed out that often the entry of a large fomwt retailer results in mass standardisation of services. A, the massproduced goods shifr to the shopping centers or to the large fonna t retailer'i, the do\.VTltown stores tend to beconv.: n1orc and n1orc customised. As an exnmple, as mass clothing shifts to the mall, one finds a trend toward more and more specialised boutiques in the downtown. This example can be extended to other unique flmctions such ~s the stores selling jewellery, music, artefacts of local craft~rnen, portrait-tnaking, or even restaurants. However, not much space is needed to support such functions 3nd as a result one finds that two or three blocks in the downtown area may thrive while the others may slide down, or the blo~ks may survive in patche~, in that a few store~ in the middle of a block may generate busines., while those at the ends may wcnr off. Tnus, the CBD area tends to become patched in terms of its economic viability. A decline in retail sales hus its own set of ripple effects. Muller (1978) , for instance, observed rhat a decline in retail sales often
Volumo 26 · Number <liS · 2000 · 13!H 54 leeds the building owners either to negotiate lower rents or to vacate the building. Smaller cities tend to be especially susceptible to the stagnation in the downtown shopping district and find it difficnlt to replace the older retailers with new ones. Thus, properties become vacant and thi• eventually leads to lower property values, taxes and even blight. In the same study, Muller found that a decline in commercial activity in downtown PlattRburg led to a reduction in gross rental income by 34 percent and a decline in prop.:rty vaha:s by 35 percent to 45 percent over a seven-yenr peri<xi. Hajdu (1988) in \'\lest Germany also observed similar effects due to the trend towards pedestrian malls.
Several downtown redevelopment schemes arc often undcnaken to prevent a decline in downtown business. For example, the Economic Development Officer for Downtown Kingston Busines• Improvement Area related the case where the Economic Development Office implemented a "Ride Free Program~. The program involved collaboration between 70 or 80 merchants in the downtown area and the Kingston Transit. As per the program, the merchants offered a free ride on the Kingston rransit with a minimum purchase from their stores. This eucouraged people to visit the downtown stores and al!;o helped to mininlise parking problems in the downtown area, As to ways to curb decline and stagnation in rJ1e downtown ~reas, research indicates that, from a planning standpoint, locating a large fonnut retailer in the downtown core may not necessarily be a successful strategy. This can be reasoned from the studies done on shopping malls, and thus can be extended to our present context. For example, in a study of the Keskl.ls mall in Thtmder Bay, Lorch and Smith (19\l?) explained that. a "forness effect" took place, which ensured that the new mall held a "monopoly over pedestrian activity" in the areas surrounding the malL They found that two out of every three shoppers who parked in mall's garage never venmrcd outside the downtown mall. An01:her effect, also found to be operational, was the "distance decay effect". The essence of this effect was that the farther the businesses were from the mall, the more they began to rely on different segments of customers. Mall customers did not venture very far from the mall. Finally, there was the "intervening opponunity effect" that was Market e-ntry effects of large format rei.J~s: a stakeholder analysis ------------Sr~hf:'n J. Arnold and Morula Narang LuthrJ observed in regard to consumers·who parked OlltMlt\1; llw mull. 1111' dT<•ct was thnt the cu~tome!'ll tended to Rhop ulong the way ro the mall, stopped at the mall and then turned around again. They did not travel ro other downtown shopping areas which lay outside their path to the mall. TI1e above discussion penains mainly to the economic effects of a large format retailer in the downtown area. However, the entrj of a large fom1at retail store may also disrupt the traditional patterns of social interchange dcvdoped in a community (Weinstein, 1994) . The dO\vntown area in a small city is not only a place where people shop, but also a place where people meet and interact with others. The city hall, the restaurants, the coffee shops, the park benches, the waterfront, theatres and cinemas serve as avenues for cultural enrichment and relaxation. However, as more and more suburban peripheral r<.,tail establishmenr.s develop, more and more customers drive there and thus fewer and fewer people frequent the downtown area and engage in a social interchange. While the shopping malls still attempt r.o integrate a communal atmosphere with the shopping experience, by providing benches and restaurants for people to engage in cultural exchange, the problem tends to be more pronounced in the case of tl1e large fonnat retailers. As mentioned, they are free-standing or at best grouped in the open air with other large format retailers in what is referred to as a "power center" (Hahn, 2000) . Even the shopping malls, despite their efforts, have been accused of replacing the feeling of "community belonging in the CBD" v•irh the feeling of "belonging in the mall".
Job creation/losses· and job quality The entry of a large format retailer is associated with both job increases and decreases. 'J11e new retailer creates more jobs but, at the same time, it also results in job losses in competitive stores, including tl1e local independents. For instance, Jones and Doucet (2000) found that big box employment in the Greater Toronto area grew by 61 percent in the 1993-1997 period while non big-box employment declined by 2 percent. Funhennorc, in 1993, 28 percent of all retail employment in five retail categories was within 2km of a big box competitor and 41 percent was more than
As to the net cfl'cct, the view endor~cd by at least some urban plannern is that the entry of a large format retailer results in a net increase in jobs. For example, the Kingston urban planners supported the proposal for a new power center on the grounds that additional employment would be brought to the city. In another instance, the manager of a local supermarket estimated tl1at the entry of a new Costco would bring 200 jobs to Kingston, which can be deemed as a "lot of employment for the Kingston area". The anal~is of 1992-1997 Greater Toronto Area employment data by Jones and Doucet (2000) revealed a 1.3 percent decrease in employment overall. However, this average masked a decline of 87 percent in catalogue stores and 82 percent in htmbcr yards and growth of 24 percent in sporting goods and toys and 14 percent in furniture/ electrical.
In H study by Rychliwsky (1996) in Brampton, Canada, it was hypothesised that the opening of the power center would lead to a net decrease in employment. However, interestingly. the results indicated that the number of layoffs decreased by 325 percent two years after rh.: opening of the power center. The data showed that there was in fact a net increas<' of 362 jobs in the retail sector. Thus, the study suppons the fact mat the entry of a large format retailer can have a net positive effect on the level of employment. However_, two issues of concern are in order. First, the power centers, which are generally "discount" based, could hire fewer people for fewer wages as a part of their low cost strategy. Rychilwsky (1996) found that the power centers tend to hire fewer people than do r<"gional malls. It was found that, while the Brampton power center employed one person for every 560 sq.ft of GLA (Gross Leasable Area), the regional mall employed one person for every 504 sq.fr. Thus, if power centern end up replacing rct,>ional malls, this can lead to a net loss in employment.
Second, the new jobs created by the large format retailers may be more or less rewarding than the jobs that are lost. Tne jobs offered by the new fnrrnat retailers may be low-wage, part-time, and include no benefits. On the other hand, these multinational retailers may bring progressive human resources practices to an antiquated market place. ·Tbus, the issue of the quality of Marl<et entry elfe(ts of la<Qe fOtmot relaHe<s: a stakeholder analysis St/1)hen J. Atnold ,1nd Monila N.vang Luthra employment generated by the new tilrmat rctniler in tcnm of wuge level, job permanence, full time-part time status, benefits and uaining is an important one and warrants further research. Market efficiency and impact on competitive market structure Conflicting views exist as to whether the entry of a lar!(e format rctaikr n:nders the market more c!Ticicn r. One point of view is that rhc new formut rctaikrs stimulate competition, promote market productivity and aid in the evolution of the market. A professional planner was of the view that, when a new retailer enters t11e xnarket, it "stimulates innovation, entrepreneurship and operating efficiency ... and provides the consumer with an ever changing array of shopping environments and selection of goods and services at competitive price levels." 1l1e opposite view on market efficiency is that the entry of a new format retailer leads to a ~lost level of service". A loss in rhe level of service occu~ when the neighbourhood malls or the independent retail srores selling milk, drugs or hardware close because of the new format entrant. Subramanian and Marquardt (1995) characterised this c1Tect as "imperfect competition [and thereby a case of] market failure." They suggested that the closure of a corner store affecr.s the immediate neighbourhood in terms of fewer choices, les!> convenience, and diminished personal service. It is in this sense that the consumer experiences a loss in the level of service.
The former town &hip of Kingston responded to this possibility through their official plan, which ensured the economic health of each of the four clements in the "commercial hierarchy" -the core area, tl1e "loop", the specialty districts, and the neighbourhood centers. The aim in having a hierarchy is to be able to ensure that no one level erodes the planned function and that the economic health of all levels is maintained. However, big box retailers such as Wal-.M.art, Costco etc., can sometimes "take over" the hierarchy because of their size, location, or the volume of merchandise sold. As an example, Rychihvsky (1996) cited a study wherein an Ontario Municipal Board notification stated that a 15 percent capture in market share by the new retailer would be deemed "detrimental to the retail hierarchy" of the community.
An interesting slant on market efficiency exists in the context of the fact that many small towns perceive the big box retailer as a stimulant to their economy. To capitalise on the tippled economic growth that follows the entry of a large format retailer, the municipal government in many cities makes provisions that favour the incoming retailer. Lang (1981), for instance, noted that the City of Corner Brook agreed to make various road improvement.s to meet the expected increase in traffic following the entry of the big box retailer. Further, the city also agreed to share some of the property costs with the developer. 1l1e consequence of this developer subsidisation is that the local independent retailers who eventually Jose sales to the incoming retailer actually assist in their entry through tax dollars.
Implications for community stakeholders
An important implication for citizens, the commw1ity, and government is that a positive surge in economic activity follows the arrival of the .large format retailer. Some businesses tend to get adversely affected, but a net positive impact, at least in the short time period covered in most studies, has been observed in terms of an increase in taxes, jobs and income.
However, the long-term impact for these communities is uncertain. Evidence pertaining to the impact of the large format retailer over a long-term period remains to be seen. For example, as a few large stores replace the more numerous but smalier independent stores, the implication of this concentration for the long-run competitive situation remains a conundrum. Competition betwe-en a Wal-Mart supercenter and a Cos teo warehouse club may not be as healthy as competition among a larger set of small competitors.
The large fonnat retailers depend on large volumes in order to he viable, an absence of which causes these swres to self-destruct. Thus it can be reasoned that the location concerns in the case of big stores are likely to be prime. In other words, the trading areas of these big box retailers are likely to be well thought out \Vitll no overlap trade possibilities. It can be speculated that the large format economics would rule out a simultaneous existence of two or more large retailers, especially in smaller communities, on account of the simple fact that the smaller ~arket entry effects of large format retaiers: a stakehokl<!r a:~ysis Stephen J. Arnold and Moni[a N.Yang luthra communities may not be able to support more than nne competing hig box retailer. Further, with low cost opt~rutlons being the trump eard in case of all the big stores, there rnlly m1t be u differential advantage, other than low prices, that a new incoming large format retailer may have in order to attract the customers. Since these large stores may not have any differentiating power among themselves, the entry of a second one may amount to a weak competitive move. 'll1is may be another reason why the large format retailers may not want to establish in the same small community. Therefore, they may create a situation of virtual monopoly and mount huge barriers to entry. 'Tbus, an issue that deserves further consideration is whether the benefits of market st1mulation outweigh the costs of creating barriers to entry.
Any decline in the CBD as a result of the entry of a large format retailer can be counteracted through the various downtown revitalisation programs. 'D1e marketing efTons can focus on bringing in people and commerce by organising seasonal events, fanners' markets, waterfront events and so on. It was brought up a few times during the interviews with our informants that tl1e downtown merchants cat.er to a very different market from the large format retailers. There seems to be some truth in this gcneml view, as has been indicated by t.he demographic protiles of the consumers who shop at the large format retailers. Thus, the downtown revitalisation efforts need be positioned to the appropriate segment of consumers.
Hallsworth and Worthington (2000) examined the issuance oflocal "loyalty cards" in the small UK town of Leominster as a reaction to gains made over the previous four years hy a newly-opened 3,307 sq.m Safeway store. The short-term success of the Leominster scheme was judged to be a consequence of its novelry, the attractiveness of the town itself and the charismatic local personalities who gained national media attention in a "David and Goliath" saga. From a long-term perspective, the more sophisticatt~d versions of loyalty cards would require resources affordable only by the larger muflicipalitics. However, the dominance of the chain stores (multiples) in these retail markets would likely preclude widespread adoption.
Legislation at the municipal, stare or federal level is the alternative to community--initiated activities and a number of authors have commented on tl1is approach. Cliquet (2000) dlscusKed varinuB attempts by the French governntent tel regulate growth of the large forn11u: retailers in response to demands of small shopkeepers. He concluded that the regulations appeared to hurt the variery stores and not the hypermarkets, other than in the short term. Belgium and Spain have similar federal regulations, whereas Italy has them at the community level. Hahn's (2000) opinion was that most European laws are not as rigid as they are in Germany where regional planning is vexy strong. However, European laws are typically stronger than those in the USA.
Stakeholder: nearby markets
Economic decline in nearby markets The nearby communities have in terms of the economic decline directly felt the impact of the large format retailer. Smaller cities that do not have large stores or shopping malls tend to lose a significant amount of sales to other cities with large format retailers or large malls. 'Ibus, while the existence of a large format retailer fortresses tl1e leakage of sales dollars from its own communiry, at the same time it creates a lce1kagc of dollars from otl1er adjoining communities.
The adjoining small communities not only experience a decline in sales, but also face a decline in property values in their central business disnict. This further leads to a decline in the property tax revenues in those communities. Other effects include a rise in unemployment and a loss of substantial sales tax revenue to the communiry with the large format retailer. Consequently, the resources with the community's municipal government for city's development dry up and this reduces the ability of the government to initiate the various development projects, such as constmction of roads, downtown revitalisation etc. Thus, a downward spiral sets in which becomes increasingly difficult to curb or reverse. Stone ( 1995) found that the sales growth in certain communities was experienced at the expense of the adjoining communities. In his analysis of towns with a population below 30,000, he compared 17 towns without WalMarr stores with 34 towns with Wal-Mart stores five ye-ars after initial entry. With the ~:xception of grocery stores, sales· in towns without Wal-Mart declined across all store sectors ranging fmm 8 percent for eating and drinking joints to 21 percent for building mat~rials. Towns within a 20-milcs radius of a Wal-Mart store experienced cumulative net sales reductions of 25 percent. Similarly, Davidson and Rummel (2000) found that all retail categories in Wal-Mart neighbour towns, with the exception of food stores, suffered decreased sales levels in at least one of four years after Wal-Mart's arrival in a nearby town.
In~plications of impacts on nearby cotnmunities The consistent, negative impact observed on the nearby communities is a maner of concern for all stakeholders. The sales gained at the expense of competitors are a fact of retail life, especially when the competitor is another large retail chain. However, when the sales lead to the closing of the small, independent retailers and a decline in the CBD of the nearby commrmities, the retailer retards the ability of the nearby community to support itself.
111e large format retailer has a rc'Sponsibility not only towards the rr.arket of entry but also r.owards all the communities that lie within its trading radius. A socially responsible large retailer would want to institute its communitybased projects in, and give charitable donations to, these nearby towns and villages along with the market of entry. For example, \Val-1vl.art often identities specific local charities to support in the local community. Similarly, Home Depot has a large "philanthropic budget" and also conducts clinics in its store on do-it-yourself projects. As a way to contribute to t.he adjoining communities, the workshops could be conducted in the town hall belonging to these adjoining municipalities. f\lternatively, these nearby communities can be made a part of the Home Depot's "in-kind" donation, whaein the company helps the community 10 build ramps for the disabled, renovates parts of the city hall or helps in the construction of parks.
Conclusions and discussion
The aim of the present paper was to set in motion a reflective exercise that would arrive at some conclusions about the impacts of
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Volume 28 · Numbef IllS · 2000 · 13'!-15-1 large format retailers. These conclusions are crucial as they can guide the efforts needed to make th(: transition towards this new retail format. What should the communities, governments and d1e big box retailer itself do, knowing that its entry creates a series of effects in the market of entry and in the adjoining communities? The challenge is to foresee and deal with the long-term irreversible changes being engendered by the new format retailers. 1l1e paper is directed at making the "big box retail phenomenon" an informed change. To summarise, the effects associated with the entry of a large format retailer include:
Inherent consumer benefits. Patronage by different demographic segments. Changes in d1.e relative ~portance of store choice attributes. Rapid market penerration. Decline in the sales of competing local retail stores. Growth and decline in various commercial secton;. Economic growth in the market of entry.
A potential for decline of the downtown central business district. Job creation and losses.
Changes in job quality. Changes to marker efficiency and competitive market structure. Economic decline in nearby markets.
Future research
"ll1e present paper raised a number of important issues. Some of the issues that deserve further exploration are as follows: Arc large format retailers vulnerable to the ageing of baby boomer age cohort? As t11e large baby boomer age cohort moves into their 50s and 60s, it might be useful to keep track of whether they continue to patronise the large format retailers. Do the large fomlat retailers create a primary demand for their offerings or do they simply take sales from other retailers and other markets? Sales comparisons could be made between the market of entry of the large format retailer and the markets adjoining the "market of entry" of the large format retailer. Funher, the measures of sales could be taken before and after its entry in these two sets of ------Stephen J. Arnold at>d Monib Nar.~ng lurhra communities. For example, in the case of the home improvements market, measures cmtld he made of the do-ityourself activity before und after n Horne Depot's entry. Do the benefits of market stimulation outweigh the "lost level of service" du" to the closure of local stores? How can market efficiency be justified when it ultimately creates the barriers to entry? Several facets of the market efficiency question deserve further consideration. 'The net changes in level of service an! of interest. It might also be interesting to study the amount of developer subsidisation that might have occurred. What is the "quality" of work at the large format retailers in tem1s of wage and benefit levels, job permanency/security, full-time/part-time status and training? Tracking employment statistics in communities over time would deterrnine whether or not a net gain occurs in terms of the number of jobs. A final issue concerns the tendency among some large format retailers to close an existing store and open a new, much larger store in a nearby market with the aim of obtaining u greater trading area. Since these cases generate negative publicity and much ill will, it might be useful to document how often this effect might have occurred.
